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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the issues raised by inflation and the
taxation of business and investment income under an income tax 
Some evidence on the tax-induced distortions caused by
inflation are presented. This includes estimates of the marginal
real tax rates on new investment and the user cost  of capital
for the various categories of taxable corporations given
different assumptions about the rate of inflation and proportion
of the investment financed by debt.
Comprehensive indexation of business and investment  income is
considered in the paper as a solution to the problems caused by
inflation-induced tax distortions.  For business
income, this would encompass an indexation of capital consumption
allowances, the cost of goods sold, and interest income and
expenses. For investment income, it would involve the indexation
of capital gains on all financial and real assets and the
indexation of interest income and expense. In this context, the
new accounting standards of the CICA designed to reflect changing
prices are reviewed and the preliminary experience with these
standards is assessed. Another related issue that is addressed is
the choice of an index. The benefits and cost of comprehensive
indexing are considered. The paper concludes its overview of
comprehensive indexation with some comments on the experience of
other countries, and a review of the U.S. Treasury Department's
recent proposals for indexation.
A more detailed analysis of the indexation of business income is
also included in the paper. Evidence on the impact of indexation,
if it were to be adopted, on the real effective tax rate and user
cost of new investment is presented for the various categories of
taxable corporations given different assumptions about the rate
of inflation and the proportion of the investment financed by
debt. The reduction in the variance of the real effective tax
rate and user cost across categories resulting from indexation is
compared with the reduction resulting from the elimination of tax
preferences.
The difficulties likely to be encountered in any effort to index
capital consumption allowances, inventories, and debt are
surveyed. Several proposals for partial indexation of
business income put forward by John Bossons, the Canadian
Manufacturers' Association in Canada and by Auerbach and 
Jorgenson in the United States are discussed.
The paper also contrasts the current capital gains tax 
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with an ideal system based on accrual taxation of real gains 
and highlights the distortions involved in the current tax 
treatment of capital gains. The government's proposals for a 
Registered Shareholder Investment Plan and the Lortie Committee's 
conclusions and recommendations are reviewed. The ensuing 
Indexed Security Investment Plan is described and analyzed. 
Estimates of effective tax rates for securities held within and 
outside of an ISIP are compared. Statistics indicating the poor 
public  acceptance of ISIPs are cited. Some explanations are
offered.
The issues arising from inflation and interest income are also
covered in the paper. This includes a discussion of the White
Paper's proposal for indexed term loans and deposits and the
reasons that it was rejected by the Lortie Committee.
The paper ends with my conclusions that, given the recent decline
in inflation, indexation of the taxation of business and
investment income should not be a tax reform priority. It should
only become a priority in two circumstances. The first would be
if inflation resurges to double-digit levels and
inflation-induced distortions again become a more serious
problem. The second would be if the Treasury Department proposals
for indexation of business and investment income are implemented
in the United States and it becomes advantageous to index to
preserve the current degree of tax harmonization between Canada
and the United States. If inflation continues to decline,
however, there is no reason to introduce indexation in Canada
regardless of whether indexation is adopted in the United States.
It would just add another unnecessary element of additional
complexity to the tax system.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Indexation has been an issue on the Canadian tax policy agenda
since the early 1970s when inflation became such a serious
problem that its distorting effects on the tax system could not
be ignored. At 10 per cent or more inflation, distortions are
major and indexation initiatives are given priority
consideration.
At 5 per cent inflation, even though the distortions  still
exist, 
indexation is not a priority issue. Below 2 per cent inflation,
 indexation would cease to be a concern.
Tax indexation is clearly only a partial and second best solution
to the widespread problems posed by inflation. Financial
reporting is distorted by inflation. Decisions are made on the
basis of inadequate and faulty information resulting in a
misallocation of resources. If the inflation is unanticipated,
the situation is compounded. Various forms of indexing such as
wage and price indexing and financial indexing attempt to get
around the problem of uncertainty over nominal magnitudes by
contracting in real terms. Tax indexing seeks to minimize the
distorting impact of inflation on tax rates and thus to reduce
the misallocations of resources attributable to inflation-induced
and unintended non-neutralities in the tax system.
The first best solution to the resource allocation problems
caused by inflation is to eliminate inflation.
Indexation is only attractive to the extent that the cost in
terms of lost output and unemployment of fiscal and monetary
policies sufficiently restrictive to eradicate inflation is
prohibitive. Now with much of the cost of the recent dose of
monetary and fiscal restraint in the past and with a reasonable
expectation of a benefit of declining or at least stable
inflation in prospect, indexation loses much of its earlier
attraction. However, in the unlikely event that monetary and
fiscal policy remain on a staunchly anti-inflationary course and
inflation breaks out for reasons beyond the control of the
monetary and fiscal authorities, then the case for further tax
indexation becomes stronger.
Over the 1970s the Canadian government has taken a number of
steps to index the tax system. Personal income tax exemptions and
brackets were indexed to the consumer price index starting in
1974. This prevented the rapid inflation of the mid-to-late 1970s
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from raising real tax burdens by pushing taxpayers into higher
tax brackets. A $1,000 deduction for interest was also introduced
in 1974 and subsequently extended to dividends and capital gains.
A rationale for this measure was to shelter from taxation the
inflation premium component of interest income for lower income
taxpayers.
The impact of inflation on the taxation of business and
investment income has also lead to a number of initiatives. It
was a factor behind the introduction of the two-year write-off
for manufacturing machinery and equipment and the investment tax
credit. In 1977 the government moved to provide some measure of
relief from the taxation of inflationary inventory profits
through the introduction of income tax deduction equal to 3 per
cent of the value of opening inventories. In June 1982 the
Minister of Finance issued a paper for consultation on Inflation
and the Taxation of Investment Income. The proposals in this
paper for a Registered Shareholder Investment Plan and for
indexed term deposits and loans were referred for study to a
Ministerial Advisory Committee, chaired by Pierre Lortie. Upon
the Lortie Committee's recommedation a renamed Indexed Securities
Investment Plan was implemented and the proposals for indexed
instruments were dropped.
The Lortie Committee recognized that the effect of inflation on
the taxation of business and investment income was a broad issue
going well beyond its terms of reference which was to examine the
desirability of one specific set of proposals to remedy some of
the problems. It thus recommended that the government undertake a
comprehensive study of the issue. This recommendation was
sympathetically received by the Minister of Finance Marc Lalonde,
but no such study was ever launched prior to the government's
defeat. A dramatic decline in inflation reduced the priority that
the government attached to the consideration of further indexing
initiatives.
This paper reviews the issues raised by inflation and the
taxation of business and investment income under an income tax in
Section 2. Some evidence on the tax-induced distortions caused by
inflation are examined. This includes some estimates of the
marginal real tax rates on new investment and the user cost  of
capital for the various categories of taxable corporations given
different assumptions about the rate of inflation and proportion
of the investment financed by debt.
Comprehensive indexation of business and investment  income is
considered as a solution in Section 3 of the paper. For business
income, this would encompass an indexation of capital consumption
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allowances, the cost of goods sold, and interest income and
expenses. For investment income, it would involve the indexation
of capital gains on all financial and real assets and the
indexation of interest income and expense. In this context, the
new accounting standards of the CICA designed to reflect changing
prices are reviewed and the preliminary experience with these
standards is assessed. Another related issue that is addressed is
the choice of an index. The benefits and cost of comprehensive
indexing are considered. The paper concludes its overview of
comprehensive indexation with some comments on the experience of
other countries.
A more detailed analysis of the indexation of business income
follows in Section 4. Evidence on the impact of indexation, if it
were to be adopted, on the real effective tax rate and user cost
of new investment is presented for the various categories of
taxable corporations given different assumptions about the rate
of inflation and the proportion of the investment financed by
debt. The reduction in the variance of the real effective tax
rate and user cost across categories resulting from indexation is
compared with the reduction resulting from the elimination of tax
preferences.
The difficulties likely to be encountered in any effort to index
capital consumption allowances, inventories, and debt are
surveyed. The section on business income concludes with a
discussion of a number of proposals for partial indexation of
business income put forward by John Bossons, the Canadian
Manufacturers' Association in Canada and by Auerbach and 
Jorgenson in the United States.
Investment income is treated in Section 5. The current capital
gains tax is contrasted with an ideal system based on accrual
taxation of real gains and the distortions are highlighted. The
government's proposals for a Registered Shareholder Investment
Plan and the Lortie Committee's  conclusions and recommendations
are reviewed. The ensuing Indexed Securities Investment Plan is
described and analyzed. Estimates of effective tax rates for
securities held within and outside of an ISIP are compared.
Statistics indicating the poor public acceptance of ISIPs are
cited. Some explanations are offered.
The issues arising from inflation and interest income are also
covered in Section 5. This includes a discussion of the White
Paper's proposal for indexed term loans and deposits and the
reasons that it was rejected by the Lortie Committee.
The final Section of the paper sets out my conclusions on
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indexation and the taxation of business and investment income.
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2 THE PROBLEM OF TAX-INDUCED DISTORTIONS 
   CAUSED BY INFLATION
2.1 General Statement of Problem
The basic problem is quite simple. Taxes are based on nominal
income. When inflation causes real income to diverge from
nominal, real effective tax rates are altered in unintended ways
that modify the pattern of after-tax returns, thus distorting
saving and investment decisions.
For business income,  the sources of distortions are the
divergence between historical and replacement cost for both
depreciation charges and cost of goods sold and the difference
between nominal and real interest expenses. Since taxes are
levied on reported income rather than real income , inflation
causes real effective tax rates to vary widely across firms and
industries. This causes the real after-tax rates of return also
to vary thus distorting investment decisions. 
For investment income, there are two sources of distortions. The
first is the difference between nominal and real interest income
and expense, which is attributable to the inflation premium
necessary to compensate lenders for the erosion of the real value
of their principal. The second is the discrepancy between nominal
and
real capital gains. The impact of this second source of
distortion is aggravated by the particular form of the capital
gains tax. Accentuating factors are limitations on losses,
taxation on a realization basis, and exemptions for gains on
principal residences. 
Worth noting is that these distortions only arise with an income
tax. In the case of a consumption tax savings and investment are
deductible and only consumption is subject to tax. This in effect
eliminates the necessity to measure real income to calculate
taxes.
The question of distortions has been raised at both the
macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. At the macroeconomic 
level the debate has focussed on the impact of inflation on the
aggregate effective corporate income tax rate. On the one side of
the argument, Abraham Tarasofsky and Bert Waslander have
contended using Department of Finance data that inflation 
seemed to have lead to an upward shift in average effective 
tax rates. The statistics cited show the real effective tax rate 
in the non-farm, non-financial sector rising from 37.2 per cent 
in 1963-65 to 44.3 per cent in 1978 and in the manufacturing 
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sectors from 42.6 per cent to 47.2 per cent.[1]  Using 
other data prepared by John Bossons based on a sample 
of 152 firms drawn from the (Financial Post) database  Waslander
has noted that the actual real tax rate rose considerably over
the 1966 to 1978 period and exceeded the statutory nominal rate
in 1975-77.[2]
On the other side of the argument, Michel Proulx has questioned
Tarosofsky and Waslander's interpretation of the Department of
Finances' data and suggested that if corporations in a loss
position are  excluded from the sample then there is no upward
trend in the effective tax rate for the non-resource sector as
a whole or for manufacturing.
A philosophical point which emerges in this debate is the extent
to which the tax incentives introduced over the course of the
1970s can be considered a general policy response to inflation.
If so, it is less clear that inflation has raised effective tax
rates. If not, the case is much stronger in favour of inflation
increasing effective tax rates. Some of the incentives such as
the 3 per cent inventory deduction are more closely linked to
inflation than others.
In spite of differences of opinion concerning the impact of
inflation on the aggregate effective tax rate, there is general
agreement that inflation has distorted tax rates across firms and
industries penalizing those with large stocks of long-lived
depreciable assets and rewarding those with lots of debt. The
following section presents the results of some analysis of the
impact of inflation on the user cost of capital and effective tax
rates for various industry groups and categories of investment
asset given different assumptions about debt financing.
2.2 Some Evidence
An indicator of the impact of inflation on investment is the user
cost of capital. As defined by Jorgenson, it is equal to the
price of investment goods multiplied by the sum of the real
interest rate (assumed to be 10 per cent) and the depreciation
rate . The calculation also incorporates a number of adjustments
to put the user cost on a before tax basis. These reflect the
corporate tax rate, capital consumption allowances, and the
investment tax credit. The differential tax impact of debt
financing was also incorporated in the calculation.
The various industry groups were selected to correspond to the
categorization of firms for tax purposes. These groups are shown
on table 1 along with the applicable corporate tax rate, and
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investment tax credit rate. The relevant distinctions are  among
large manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms (subject to tax
rates of 40 and 46 per cent respectively) and  small
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms (subject to tax rates
of 20 and 25 percent). Another important distinction is for
investment in the Atlantic and Gaspe regions where the investment
tax credit is 20 per cent instead of 7 per cent. With respect to
the type of investment the most important distinctions are
between machinery and equipment, and non-residential construction
and between manufacturing and non-manufacturing investment. As a
general rule abstracting from the many categories of assets for
purposes of capital consumption allowances, investment in
machinery and equipment qualifies for a 20 per cent declining
balance write-off  except in manufacturing where the write-off is
50 per cent straight line for production machinery and equipment.
Investment in non-residential construction qualifies for a 5 per
cent declining balance write-off. An important qualification is
that only a half year write-off is allowed in the first year. It
is worth noting that the capital consumption allowances rates
utilized are greater than the rates of economic depreciation
which are estimated to be 7.89 per cent for machinery and
equipment and 3.45 per cent for non-residential
construction.[3]
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As can be seen from chart 1, assuming 5 per cent inflation the
user cost ranges from  22.8 per cent for machinery and equipment
investment for large non-Atlantic region non-manufacturing
corporations to 17.2 per cent for machinery and equipment
investment by large Atlantic region manufacturing corporations.
The user cost is lower for non-residential construction because
of the lower rate of depreciation except in the case of large
Non-Atlantic region manufacturing.
Charts 2 and 3 show the impact of inflation and debt financing on
user cost for manufacturing and non-manufacturing respectively.
It is interesting to note the extent to which the tendency of
inflation to raise the user cost by reducing the present value of
capital consumption allowances is more than offset by the
advantage resulting from the deductibility of the inflation
premium in interest payments. For debt financing ratios of 25 per
cent or more inflation actually causes the user cost to drop.
The real effective tax rate for the same industry groups and
types is a revealing indicator of the impact of inflation and the
tax system on the incentive to invest. This real effective tax
rate is calculated  by dividing the present value of real tax
payments by the present value of real inflation-adjusted income.
The discount rate utilized in the calculations is 10 per cent.
This is the same as the assumed before-tax rate of return.
Economic depreciation is assumed to be the same as in the user
cost calculations.
The real effective tax rates by industry groups and type of
investment calculated assuming a 5 per cent rate of inflation are
displayed in chart 4. Real effective tax rates are in all cases
substantially lower than statutory rates. Indeed for machinery
and equipment the real effective tax rates are negative for large
Atlantic region manufacturing corporations and small
manufacturing corporations.
Charts 5 and 6 show the impact of inflation on the real effective
tax rate for manufacturing and non-manufacturing investment given
different assumptions about the extent to which the investment is
debt financed. An increase in the rate of inflation from 5
per cent to 10 per cent raises the real effective tax rate for
both both types of manufacturing and non-manufacturing investment
if the investment is not debt financed. However, if the
investment is 25 per cent or more debt financed, the increase in
inflation would actually lower the effective tax rate. In fact,
if the investment were 50 per cent debt financed, the effective
tax rates would in all cases be translated into hefty subsidies
by the increase in inflation.
-9-
A conclusion which can be drawn from this analysis is that,
although inflation distorts the real effective tax rate on new
investment, it has probably not increased it on average. The
tendency of  historic cost capital consumption allowances  to
push up real effective tax rate has probably been neutralized in
the aggregate by  the deductibility of the inflation premium on
interest payments. The introduction of investment incentives  at
least in part to compensate for any possible adverse effect of
inflation on investment has probably tipped the tax system on
balance in favour of promoting investment.
A recent  study by  Robin Boadway, Neil Bruce, and Jack Mintz
covering the 1963 to 1978 period sheds some additional light on
the issue of the impact of inflation on effective tax rates.[4]
Their finding was that, in spite of the lack of indexing,
inflation reduced the effective tax rate (including corporate and
personal income tax combined) on land, had little effect on
machinery and buildings, and raised the tax on inventories. The
corporate income tax taken alone subsidized the holding of land
and machinery, but taxed buildings and especially inventories. On
this basis, they concluded that the corporate tax structure
itself does not much affect the marginal investment decision
except for inventories. 
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3 COMPREHENSIVE TAX INDEXATION
3.1 The Components of Comprehensive Tax Indexation
If tax-induced distortions in the allocation of resources are
caused by mismeasurements of income due to inflation, then an
obvious solution to the problem is to base taxes on income
adjusted to correct for inflation. There is general agreement
about the form of the adjustments required. The adjustments for
business income are three:
- the indexation of the undepreciated capital cost of assets by
the rate of inflation.
- the indexation of the cost of sales.
- the removal from interest expense of an inflation premium
(calculated as the rate of inflation times the nominal value of
debt).
The adjustments for investment income are also three:
- the exclusion from interest income of the inflation premium.
- the same exclusion from interest expense for borrowers.
- the indexation of the cost base of investment assets other than
debt for purposes of calculating capital gains.
The White Paper on Inflation and the Taxation of Personal
Investment income notes that these adjustments might necessitate
other changes in the tax system. Provisions which would have to
be re-examined include accelerated capital consumption
allowances, the 3-per-cent inventory allowance, the $1,000
investment income deduction, and certain capital gains
preferences.[5]
3.2 Accounting Issues in the Measurement of Income
There are two accounting methods for reporting the effects of
changing prices. The first is current cost accounting. It seeks
to evaluate the assets of a business including inventories, and
property, plant and equipment, and the costs associated with
these assets such as cost of goods sold and depreciation charge
at the current prices most applicable to the particular assets
and costs. The second is general price level accounting. It
measures costs in terms of real purchasing power as measured by a
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general price index such as the consumer price index or the
implicit price index for gross national expenditure. The
adjustments for business income necessary to correct for
inflation noted above fall under this rubric.
Because a general price index is utilized and the differential
impact of relative price changes on asset values are ignored,
general price level accounting does not measure the effect of
inflation on the particular financial position of an individual
firm as accurately as current cost accounting. However, general
price level accounting does not require as much judgement as
current cost accounting and is simpler to apply. Moreover, for
many purposes it may provide an adequate approximation of the
impact of inflation on a firm.
The Canadian accounting profession and its official
representative, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
(CICA), have gone through a long formal process of debate on the
merits of these two approaches in an effort to arrive at the best
set of accounting standards for Canada to account for the effect
of changing prices. The process involved the publication of
exposure drafts on proposed standards and culminated in the
issuance in 1982 of "Reporting the effects of changing prices" as
Section 4510 of the CICA Handbook. This section contained a new
accounting standard to apply in fiscal years beginning on or
after January 1, 1983.
The new accounting standard calls for supplementary information
in annual reports on the effects of changing prices to be
presented for large publicly held enterprises (with inventories
and property, plant and equipment of $50 million or more, or
total assets of $350 million or more). Pending further
consideration the standards do not apply to income producing real
estate assets and banks, trust companies and insurance companies.
The two capital maintenance concepts of operating capability and
financial capital are reflected in the standard and both current
cost and general price level accounting information are
recommended.
The current cost information includes:
- the current cost of goods sold and the depreciation, depletion,
and amortization of property, plant and equipment, or the amounts
of the current cost adjustments for these items;
- the amount of changes during the reporting period in the
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current cost amounts of inventory and property, plant and
equipment;
- the carrying value of inventory and property, plant and
equipment
on a current cost basis at the end of the reporting period;
- net assets after restating inventory and property, plant and
equipment on a current cost basis at the end of the reporting
period;
- the amount of the financing adjustment (calculated by applying
the proportion of net monetary liabilities on a current cost
basis to the aggregate of shareholders' equity on a current cost
basis and net monetary liabilities to the current cost
adjustments made to income for the period).
The specific constant dollar information to be disclosed can be
calculated using either the consumer price index or the implicit
price index for gross national expenditures. This information
includes:
- the "general inflation component" of changes in the current
cost amounts of inventory and property, plant and equipment;
- the general purchasing power gain or loss resulting from
holding
net monetary items; and
- comparative figures restated for changes in the general
purchasing power of the dollar.
The current cost guidelines have now been in effect for almost
two years. Most companies covered have issued an annual report to
which they should have applied. Of the 263 annual reports
reviewed by the CICA,[6] only 57 or 22 per cent presented the
recommended supplementary information. Another 10 firms supplied
some information on the effect of inflation, but did not conform
to guidelines. A total of 196 firms or 75 per cent did not
present any information at all. Of these, 28 gave some reasons
for not complying, the most common of which were the high cost of
preparing the disclosure in relations to the benefits and the
subjectivity, complexity, and lack of utility of the inflation
adjusted information. Another reason for business resistance to
inflation accounting, which was not cited, is a reluctance to
disclose lower income to shareholders. The benefits to be derived
from inflation accounting quite obviously decline with the rate
of inflation, as does the degree of support for the concept.
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There does not seem to be much independent interest in the
information on the impact of relative price changes provided by
current cost accounting.
A factor that may have influenced some firms not to prepare the
information was a statement released by the Ontario Securities
Commission notifying firms that current cost information did not
have to be included in documents filed with the Commission. It is
significant that many of the firms that disclosed the recommended
information were those who also report to the Securities and
Exchange Commission in the United States where supplementary
inflation-adjusted information is mandatory.
The longer experience with inflation accounting in the United
States and United Kingdom has also been unsatisfactory. The
problem in these countries is that the information once prepared
at great cost in time and effort has been put to little use. This
has been a source of growing dissatisfaction with the standards.
As of yet, however, no consensus has developed concerning what
would be a more suitable and useful inflation accounting
method.[7]
The cool reception of inflation accounting based largely on
current costs indicates a lack of acceptance of the basic
principles on which comprehensive tax indexation are based. This
stems from a failure to understand fully the concepts involved
and a general dislike of what is viewed as unnecessary
complexity. If large companies are reluctant to cope with the
complexities of inflation accounting, imagine the reaction of
smaller companies.[8]
If comprehensive tax indexation were to be adopted and accepted,
it would probably have to be based on general price level
accounting. The advantage of general price level accounting is
that it is somewhat less complex. It also requires the
application of less judgement and would be easier to audit. But
even so it is doubtful that the business community could be
induced to accept comprehensive indexation unless inflation was
running at a very high level and indexation was accompanied by
large enough tax cuts to offset its perceived disadvantages in
added complexity.
3.3 The Choice of an Index
An issue that arises in any consideration of tax indexation
comprehensive or otherwise is the choice of an index. The
possibilities range from the use of many individual prices and
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special indexes such as are used in current cost accounting to
the use of a general price index such as the consumer price index
or gross national expenditure deflator. Individual prices or
special indices are likely to be more accurate in measuring
depreciation charges or the cost of goods from inventories.
However, income measured on a  comprehensive basis can best be
gauged using a general price index. The most logical price index
for use in indexation  is the consumer price index. It is widely
known and available on a timely and monthly basis. It is also,
unlike the GNE deflator, the other broad measure of overall
inflation that could be used, not subject to revision. The
consumer price index is already being utilized to index social
security benefits and personal exemptions and tax brackets under
the Income Tax Act.
It has been argued by some that the consumer price index is
inadequate for use in indexation for several reasons related to
macroeconomic policy. First, it does not reflect changes in
consumption patterns except through changes in weights which only
occur every four years. Second, it may reflect relative
price changes against the effect of which the economy can not be
insulated and to which it must adjust. These include increases in
import prices, food prices and energy prices. As a result, some
have suggested that the most appropriate index would be the
consumer price index excluding food and energy and imports. The
exclusion of food and energy would be a relatively simple matter
because they are components of the CPI. The exclusion of the
impact of import price increases would be more difficult as the
cost of imports form part of the total price of many individual
components. Further possible exclusions on stabilization policy
grounds might be for indirect taxes, or interest rate changes. If
the government raises indirect taxes or tightens monetary policy
to restrain the economy, it would not necessarily be desirable
to have tax indexing introducing offsetting tax reductions.
While the Lortie Committee concluded that the consumer price
index is the only feasible price index to use for inflation
adjustments of the personal income tax, the Committee was
sufficiently concerned about the issues raised by the choice of
an appropriate index for various inflation adjustments that it
suggested that "it would be prudent to establish an independent
body to examine regularly the design of an appropriate set of
price indices for various purposes and confirm the integrity of
these indices."[9]
The choice of an index for indexing is a significant issue, but
not one of overriding importance. The cumulative difference
between any two general price indexes is likely to be minor
-15-
relative to cumulative inflation.
3.4 Experience in Other Countries
Comprehensive indexing of the income tax has not been adopted by
any of the major industrialized countries. Some South American
countries suffering from hyper-inflation such as Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile have implemented fairly comprehensive indexing
schemes.[10] Some industrialized countries have limited forms of 
indexing such as LIFO inventory accounting in the U.S., 
distinctions between real and inflationary gains in Israel, 
and the indexation of certain gains in the United Kingdom.[11] 
Since the beginning of the slowdown in inflation in 1982 no 
industrialized country (with the exception of Ireland) has 
implemented further indexation incentives.
3.5 The Recent United States Treasury Department Proposals
The United States Treasury Department has recently issued a
report proposing an ambitious package of tax reforms.[12]
An important part of these proposals deals with the taxation of
income from business and capital in order to eliminate
inflation-induced distortions. In particular, it is proposed that
inflation adjustments be made in the calculation of capital
consumption allowances, the cost of goods sold from inventories,
capital gains, and interest income and expense. These adjustments
are to replace the current ad hoc adjustments for inflation
incorporated in the investment tax credit, accelerated write-offs
of depreciable property, and the partial exclusion of long-term
capital gains.
The adjustments to capital consumption allowances would be the 
indexation of the cost base of depreciable assets to the consumer
price index. The investment tax credit would be repealed. Capital
consumption allowances would be determined on the basis of
economic depreciation on the indexed cost base.
For inventories, firms would be given the option of employing
indexed FIFO, instead of the currently allowed LIFO or unindexed
FIFO. Indexed FIFO measures income more accurately during a
period of inflation than LIFO, which only defers inflationary
gains until inventories are reduced or liquidated.
The tax treatment of capital gains would be adjusted for
inflation by indexing the basis of capital assets for the
inflation which has occurred since purchase of the asset or
January 1, 1965, whichever was later. This would result in nearly
-16-
complete adjustment for inflation, while at the same time
limiting the size of the table of inflation adjustment factors.
Inflation-adjusted gains would be taxed as income on a proposed
reduced schedule of individual rates, and the current exclusion
of 60 per cent of capital gains would be terminated.
A given fraction of interest income based on an estimate of the
inflation premium in nominal interest rates would be excluded
from tax. This same fraction would be applied to reduce the
deduction of interest expense (in excess of the sum of mortgage
interest attributable to the principal residence of an individual
taxpayer and $5,000). The fraction of interest income and expense
to be excluded in calculating interest income and expense would
be announced each year. This approach is said to offer only a
rough adjustment for inflation, but to avoid the undesirable
complexity of a more exact scheme.
3.6 Benefits and Costs of Comprehensive Indexing
In an inflationary environment a  comprehensive indexation of the
taxation of business and investment income would remove the tax
distortions impeding the efficient allocation of investment and
savings. It would also reduce the risk associated with future
variations in effective tax rates due to inflation. This would
contribute to a better allocation of resources provided that the
rationale for comprehensive indexation was understood and the
public responded to the new signals given by inflation-adjusted
after-tax rates of return. The better allocation of investment
would tend to promote real growth.
It is not clear on balance, however, whether investment would be
higher or lower. This would depend among other things on the
nature of the other tax changes required to compensate for the
revenue loss from comprehensive indexation. It would also depend
on the distribution of the tax changes between corporations and
investors. The cost of capital in Canada is tied quite closely to
that in the United States by international capital markets and
capital flows. Thus, while corporations would benefit from
indexation of capital cost allowances and inventories, they would
experience an increase in the after tax cost of capital as a
result of the cessation of the deduction of the inflation premium
on interest payments.
Investors, on the other hand, would receive greater after-tax
returns on debt since they would no longer be taxed on the
inflation premium. This would encourage savings and lead to
capital outflows. Only to the extent that capital markets are
imperfect would greater savings result in a significant decrease
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in before-tax rates of return and the cost of capital to
corporation thus offsetting the disincentive of reduced interest
deductibility. The only area where this offset is likely to be
most significant concerns the cost and availability of new equity
funds to business. Equity capital is probably less mobile between
the U.S. and Canada particularly for smaller firms.
The reasons why the cost of capital to firms is so important for
investment is that firms are the key decision-makers when it
comes to investment decisions. Modern business organization has
effectively separated the savings and investment decisions.
The integrated tax rate of the corporation and investor combined
is not a prime consideration underlying investment decisions for
widely held corporations.
The financial implications of comprehensive tax indexation would
be considerable even at 5 per cent inflaton. For example, in 1981
capital consumption allowances were $24.2 billion. Five years
indexation at 5 per cent on such a base would raise CCA by $6.7
billion and would reduce total government revenues by around $2.6
billion, about 71 per cent of which would be federal and 29 per
cent provincial. In 1981 the 3 per cent inventory allowance cost
$791 million. To increase the inventory deduction to compensate
for an assumed 5 per cent rate of inflation would cost an
additional $527 million. In 1981 interest income of corporations
was $46.3 billion and interest expense was $55.3 billion, adding
up to a net interest expense of $9.0 billion. Inflation averaged
12.5 per cent in 1981 and short-term interest rates 17.8 per
cent. If the inflation premium were excluded, net interest
expense would be reduced by about $6.4 billion in 1981. This is
the same order of magnitude as five years indexing of CCA at 5
per cent. Thus, assuming 5 per cent inflation the costs of
indexing corporate income taxes would roughly cancel out after
five years. In the shorter-run, however, the non-deductibility of
the inflation premium would raise substantially more corporate
tax revenue than would be lost through the indexation of capital
consumption allowances and inventory cost.
It is at the level of the personal income tax where comprehensive
tax indexation would involve a major revenue loss to the
government treasury. In the federal government's (Taxation
Statistics) for 1981 interest income of $19.5 billion is
reported. Of this at most only $4.9 billion was sheltered by the
interest, dividend and capital gains deduction. At the 1981 level
of interest rates and inflation, the inflation premium in the
remainder amounts to more than $10 billion. Assuming a 40
per cent marginal tax rate, exempting the inflation premium of
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personal investment income would cost the federal government
alone more than $4 billion.
Estimating the revenue cost of indexing the capital gains tax for
inflation is a very complicated exercise. Suffice it to note that
in 1981 net taxable gains were $2.4 billion and that the largest
part of these gains was inflationary. Assuming a 40 per cent
marginal tax rate the revenue from capital gains taxation would
be around $1 billion. The cost of indexing capital gains could
build up towards this order of magnitude after indexing had been
in effect for a number of years.
The magnitude of these gross revenue changes and the
corresponding redistribution of the tax burden would give rise to
large windfall gains and losses with the accompanying
revaluations in asset values. These can not be ignored.
Especially hard hit would be heavy borrowers who would no longer
be able to deduct the inflation premium on interest payments.
Concern to minimize windfall gains and losses have lead to
suggestions that indexation should be limited to new assets and
liabilities.
Comprehensive indexation would also have important international
implications. U.S. subsidiaries are taxed on their Canadian
income when it is repatriated. This tax is calculated based on
U.S. tax definitions, and credit is given for Canadian taxes paid
up to a maximum of U.S. tax payable. If comprehensive indexation
were to raise Canadian taxes above U.S. taxes, U.S. corporate
investment in Canada would be discouraged. If it were to lower
Canadian taxes, some additional U.S. investment in Canada might
be encouraged, but some tax revenue could also be transferred to
the U.S. Treasury. Neither discouraging U.S. investment or
transfering tax revenues to the U.S. would be particularly
desirable from a Canadian point of view. On the other hand, if
the U.S. were to implement comprehensive indexation as proposed,
these same arguments would suggest that Canada should do
likewise.
Comprehensive indexation would be a sufficiently radical
modification to the Canadian tax system that tax treaties would
have to be renegotiated. More fundamentally such a different
system in Canada than in other countries would certainly not
facilitate tax harmonization. It would make corporations
uncertain of the tax consequences of investment in Canada. Again,
if the U.S. were to implement comprehensive indexation, it would
be necessary to do likewise in Canada to preserve the current
degree of tax harmonization.
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A stabilization policy consideration would be that
non-deductibility of the inflation premium could exacerbate the
effects of tight money and high interest rates on firms. This
could be a particular problem as long as the United States does
not index its tax system. With the deductibility of nominal
interest payments allowed in the U.S., the Federal Reserve Board
may have to raise interest rates to higher levels to curtail 
demand. The repercussions of such a policy in Canada would be
magnified by an indexed tax system.
Last but not least on any balance sheet of costs and benefits,
given the current priority attached to simplifying the tax
system, would be the required complexity of any system of
comprehensive indexing and the related administrative costs. The
degree of complexity would be greater if windfall losses were to
be minimized through transitional arrangements. These would have
to deal with the complicated questions of the scope of the debt
adjustment and the definition of corporate entities.
Administrative costs for taxpayers would stem from the
requirement of additional accounting records. Experience with the
new CICA standards suggests this can not be dismissed lightly.
The revenue authorities would also have to expend  more resources
in processing and auditing inflation-adjusted tax returns if the
integrity of the tax system were to be maintained.
The review of the benefits and costs of comprehensive tax
indexation can not be summarized in a bottom line figure. But at
current rates of inflation, and barring the adoption of
comprehensive tax indexation in the United States, there is not
much to commend it as a desirable and practical short-term policy
option. However, if the United States were to adopt comprehensive
tax indexation as proposed in the recent Treasury Department
report, then comprehensive tax indexation would become a much
more attractive, or indeed irresistible, option for Canada as
well. Furthermore,  in the longer-run, if inflation is not
successfully curtailed , comprehensive tax indexation will have
to be seriously considered for Canada on its own merits
regardless of whether the U.S. tax system is indexed.
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4 BUSINESS INCOME
4.1 The Effect of Indexation of Business Income on Real
Effective Tax Rates
Indexation of business income would eliminate  inflation-induced
distortions in the taxation of business income. The real
effective tax rate would no longer be affected by inflation. An
appreciation of the impact of indexing on the real effective tax
rate can be gained by recalculating the effective tax rates
presented in charts 4 to 6 assuming that business income were to
be indexed. Since the effective tax rates are for income from new
investment, it makes no difference to the analysis whether the
indexation is comprehensive or is only applicable to new assets
and liabilities. The indexed real effective tax rates are shown
in chart 7 for the case where inflation is assumed to be 5 per
cent and investment is  equity financed. The indexed effective
tax rates are significantly lower than those shown in chart 4
because inflation no longer erodes the real value of capital
consumption allowances. The pattern across industry groups and
investment types remains largely unchanged reflecting the
structure of taxation.
The impact of indexing on the effective tax rate of manufacturing
investment can be seen more clearly in chart 8.  If the
investment is not debt financed, the impact on the effective tax
rate for machinery and equipment is less than for non-residential
construction. This is so because the 50 per cent capital
consumption allowance rate on machinery and equipment allows the
cost of the investment to be written off much sooner than the 5
per cent rate on non-residential construction, thus preventing
its real value from being eroded as much by inflation. In the
case of debt financing, indexing raises the real effective tax
rate significantly. The increase is quite striking if the share
of the investment that is debt financed is as high as 50 per
cent.
The impact of indexing on the effective tax rates for
non-manufacturing investment is given in chart 9. The impact the
effective tax rate on investment in non-residential construction
is similar to that in manufacturing because the capital
consumption allowance rates are the same. The impact on the
effective tax rate on investment in machinery and equipment,
however, is greater if the investment is equity financed since
lower capital consumption allowances mean more time for erosion
by inflation. On the other hand, the impact is somewhat less if
the investment is debt financed  because the effect of indexing
capital consumption allowances offsets the impact of indexing
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debt.
A useful indicator of the extent of the reduction in distortions
which would result from indexing is the decrease in the variance
of real effective tax rates across the various cases considered.
These cases encompass the six industry groups, the two types of
investment, and the three assumptions with respect to debt
financing. The standard deviation of real effective tax rates
declines from 27.5 per cent without indexing to 20.1 per cent
with indexing. This is a fairly significant reduction, but it
is much less than the reduction which would occur if capital
consumption allowances were made to correspond  to economic
depreciation and the investment tax credit were abolished. In
this event the standard deviation of the real effective tax rate
would decline to 14.6 per cent. If on top of this the tax system
were indexed, the standard deviation of the real effective tax
rate would fall to 10.0 per cent.
The implication of this analysis is that, if the main objective
of tax reform is to improve resource allocation by reducing
distortions in real effective tax rates, a higher priority should
be put on rationalizing the structure of tax incentives than on
introducing indexation. However, the two approaches to tax reform
could be pursued in a complementary manner. The rationale for
doing so would be particularly strong if the tax incentives were
introduced originally to compensate for high inflation and were
no longer considered to be necessary because of the return to
lower inflation. If the indexing could be implemented at the same
time as the current structure of tax incentives was made more
neutral, the reductions in distortions would be correspondingly
greater. On the other hand, if the tax inentive were introduced
to promote industrial and regional development objectives and
were working as intended, it may be desirable to leave them in
place.
4.2 Indexation of Cost of Goods in Inventory
As Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz pointed out, over the 1963 to 1978
period inflation significantly raised the effective tax rate on
inventory holdings thus inducing an under-investment in inventory
stocks.[13] This disincentive was transformed in the March 1977 
budget with the introduction of a deduction equal to 3 per 
cent of opening inventories. While this deduction does 
not fully compensate for the impact of inflation on inventories 
given that it is capped at 3 per cent, combined with the 
deductibility of nominal interest payments on inventory loans 
it can constitute a net incentive to invest in inventories.[14]
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If comprehensive indexation were to be introduced, any bias for
or against inventory investment would be eliminated. With an
inventory deduction already in place, this could be accomplished
relatively simply by removing the 3 per cent limit on the present
deduction.
4.3 The Treatment of Interest
The treatment of net interest expense is always the main point of
contention in any discussion of the desirability of the 
indexation of business income. Businessmen and their accountants
strongly resist the notion that the inflation premium on interest
payments should not be an allowable deduction. This is because
total interest expense is a cash outflow to the firm which must
be met. In contrast, the decline in the real value of outstanding
debt is an accrual item that is not associated with a cash inflow
and can only be realized by taking on additional debt. Most
businessmen are understandably reluctant to borrow more money,
particularly if it is just to pay taxes.
While businessmen are not comfortable with the concept of
indexation as evidenced by the poor compliance with the CICA
inflation accounting guidelines, self-interest would probably
suffice to convince them of the merits of indexing capital
consumption allowances and inventories. No such motivation would
be operative for debt indexation and their natural degree of
resistance would consequently be reinforced.
The reality which must be faced is that indexation would raise
taxes for many corporations. The indexation of debt interest is
the revenue generating side of indexation.
A difficulty with indexing debt is that the tax increases would
be heaviest for the corporations with the greatest debt burdens.
This of course is appropriate from an allocative point of view
since it is these corporations that derive the most benefit from
the full deductibility of debt. Unfortunately, it is also these
firms that are in the weakest financial positions and are least
able to withstand tax increases. Indeed, some of these firms
could even be forced into bankruptcy by the disallowance of the
inflation premium portion of interest expense.
The full deduction of interest expense provides a powerful
incentive to undertake debt-financed investment. The corollary to
this is that the implementation of interest indexation
would, other things being equal, depress investment spending. 
An important consideration in deciding upon the appropriate tax
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treatment of business interest expense is the tax status of the
corresponding interest income counted as investment income. The
current situation has been complicated by the growing importance
of tax exempt lenders and tax sheltered interest income. Pension
funds and registered savings plans are important sources of
demand for corporate debt issues. They would become much more
important if the new government decides to go ahead with the
previous government's plans to increase the limits for tax
assisted retirement savings. The $1000 investment income
deduction also shelters much interest income.
Some observers have said that with the proliferation of tax
exempt savings vehicles the income tax was being transformed into
an ad hoc expenditure tax. Indexation of debt interest  would
halt this trend by ensuring that at least the inflation premium
of interest income was taxed before being distributed by the
corporation.
The partial non-deductibility of business interest expense
resulting from indexing could pose some problems for
stabilization policy. The full deductibility of interest expense
in the United States gives  the Federal Reserve Board more
latitude to tighten monetary policy  if inflation were to
accelerate. If the Bank of Canada were to follow the U.S. lead,
the increase in the after-tax cost of capital would be much
greater as would the impact on business investment. There is a
strong case on stabilization policy grounds for treating business
interest expense the same as it is treated in the U.S. The
non-deductibility of interest on consumer and mortgage loans was
a factor making the recession deeper in Canada than in the U.S.
By the same token, if the Treasury Department proposals for
comprehensive tax indexation were to be implemented in the United
States, there would be an advantage on stabilization policy
grounds in indexing the taxation of interest in Canada. It is the
differential deductibility of interest that causes problems for
stabilization policy, not the deductibility of real versus
nominal interest payments.
4.4 Partial Indexation Schemes
The difficulties likely to be encountered in any comprehensive
indexation of business income have encouraged a search for less
ambitious ways to provide some of the same benefits. These
proposals range from from simple suggestions that more ad hoc
incentives be introduced and that LIFO inventory accounting be
adopted to schemes for comprehensive indexing  at the margin.
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The Canadian  Manufacturers' Association has put forward a
proposal to index equity. This proposal would allow a deduction
from income equal to the product of inflation and the equity of a
business expressed in terms of the tax values of assets. The
alleged advantage of this proposal is its simplicity. Its main
drawback is that it does not get to the root of the problem of
eliminating distortions due to the differential impact of
inflation on real debt costs and fixed asset costs between types
of assets and firms.[15]
Alan J. Auerbach and Dale W. Jorgenson advanced a proposal for
inflation-proofing the depreciation of assets in the United
States. This proposal would provide the firm with the complete
depreciation deduction at the time the asset was purchased. This
one-time deduction which would replace the investment tax credit
and ordinary  depreciation would be calculated as the present
value of economic depreciation. Such a scheme would be neutral in
impact across asset classes as long as the economic depreciation
rates and the discount rate is accurate. An advantage of this
proposal to a firm is that it supplies up-front cash to defray
the costs of an investment. From the point of view of a
government trying to reduce an outsized deficit this would be
viewed as a disadvantage.[16]
John Bossons has long been the leading Canadian proponent of
further initiatives to index the taxation of business income. As
a way of avoiding many of the transitional problems associated
with comprehensive indexation, he has proposed that the
indexation only be applied to "new" assets and debts. Such assets
would be defined so as to make it difficult to transform old
assets into new assets, although Bossons does acknowledge that
some rules may be necessary to restrict the transfer of assets
and liabilities between associated companies and between
corporations and shareholders.
Old debt would be defined as an allowance equal to the amount of
debt on which the taxpayer was eligible to deduct carrying
charges as of the start-date. The allowance would be reduced by
say 5 per cent per year until it disappeared after 20 years.
Taxpayers would be permitted to deduct carrying charges on
outstanding debt up to a limit equal to the product of the
allowed debt limit and the average interest on outstanding debt.
On debt in excess of the limit only the real component of
interest would be deductible.[17]  Similar treatment was proposed 
for interest bearing investment assets.
A similar distinction between old and new assets would be made.
It would be based on an arbitrary limit determined by the
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undepreciated capital cost in each asset class as of the
announcement date of the proposal. Only undepreciated capital
cost in excess of the limit would be indexed. Under the proposal
inventories would not be indexed.
Bossons argues that his proposal would produce most of the
benefits of comprehensive indexation since most decisions of
importance would be concerned with changes in new assets
(investment) and  new debt. At the same time it would minimize
transitional problems. Transitional windfall gains and losses
would be minimized. The aggregate tax revenue cost to the
government would also be minimized. And finally, the tax changes
would probably be small enough to be absorbed by the
international tax minimization procedures of multinational
companies and would thus not result in any significant transfer
of revenues to foreign treasuries. The main criticism of Bosson's
proposal has been on administrative grounds.[18] Any tax measure
 that requires the taxpayer to keep and report information on the
levels for various depreciable  asset classes, interest earning
assets and debt as of a particular date and to write these levels
down over time would necessarily introduce a major additional
element of complexity into the tax system. Next to this, the much
criticized complexity of the cumulative deduction account looks
relatively straightforward. In effect, a double set of books
would be required for the affected assets and liabilities. This
would make it much more difficult for taxpayers, especially small
businesses, to prepare their tax forms and for Revenue Canada to
process them. Enforcement and audit would also be rendered more
difficult. Any additional rules to restrict the transfer of
assets and liabilities would only worsen the situation.
Bossons acknowledges that his proposal would add to the
complexity of the tax system but he regards that to be a
necessary by-product of correcting the tax system for inflation
without windfall gains and losses and reductions in tax revenues.
If inflation heads back up to double-digit levels, Bosson's
proposal merits serious consideration. At current levels of
inflation the increase in complexity it entails is probably not
worth the gains in efficiency.
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5 INVESTMENT INCOME
5.1 Capital Gains
Income tax is levied on realized increases in the capital value
of listed assets. Half of the capital gain must be included in
taxable income and is taxable at ordinary rates. The $1,000
investment income deduction can be used to shelter capital gains.
Gains on a principal residence are exempt. Capital gains are
deemed to be realized at the death of a taxpayer. Half of net
capital losses are deductible from income up to a limit of
$2,000. Unutilized losses can be carried back three years and
forward indefinitely.
The capital gains tax has been characterized by John Bossons as a
package of distinct taxes and subsidies. In addition to a tax on
real accrued capital gains, other components of the package
include "inflation-induced taxes on wealth, additional taxes
levied on risky investments, subsidies to investors who do not
trade their assets, subsidies of investments channeled through
trust and insurance companies, and subsidies to individual
households who invest in owner-occupied houses rather than other
assets."[19]  The effects of most of these other taxes and 
subsidies are exacerbated by inflation. The principal exceptions
are the subsidies for investors that do not trade. The taxation
of capital gains only on realization serves to mitigate
inflation-induced increases in effective tax rates since the
present value of taxes due in the future is less than that of
taxes due in the present.
In theory the ideal neutral capital gains tax would be based on
accrued real capital gains. Taxation could still be at half
rates. This would generate the same degree of integration of the
personal and corporate income tax as the current dividend
gross-up and credit system produces. It would ensure that
corporate source income would be taxed at the same rate
regardless of whether taken as dividends in capital gains. Such
balance is important because it would result in a uniform
treatment of shares of companies with different payout ratios and
would not distort the dividend payout decision. It also would
avoid creating any incentives for surplus stripping, whereby
corporate source income is realized as capital gains to minimize
taxation.
The extent of the divergence of the actual capital gains tax from
the ideal for different investment assets for a taxpayer facing a
marginal tax rate of 50 per cent is shown in Table 2. (The
assumptions made with respect to real capital gains and holding
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periods for these different assets is given in Table 3.) The only
asset for which the actual capital gains tax approximates the
ideal is the Indexed Security Investment Plan (ISIP). The real
effective tax rate for the ISIP is marginally than the 25 per
cent ideal rate reflecting the slight advantage of deferral
offered by the ISIP. The degree to which the advantage of tax
deferral on other assets resulting from taxation only upon
realization compensates for the tax raising impact of inflation
without indexing is shown in Table 2. The corollary to this is
that the combination of taxation on realization and inflation
accentuates the lock-in effect that hampers the more efficient
redeployment of investment resources. Inflation-induced tax
increases are highest for urban rental property, farm land, and
common stock of large public corporations. These tax increases
reinforce the incentive in favour of principal residences and
other tax sheltered investments. This diverts savings into
residential construction and fosters the institutionalization of
savings.
An additional source of distortion not revealed in Table 2 stems
from the full and immediate deduction of nominal interest on debt
incurred to finance investments in appreciated assets. To varying
degrees this can offset the impact of inflation and lead to a
more neutral overall taxation of capital gains. Indeed it is
argued in a 1980 green paper reviewing the taxation of capital
gains that " for capital properties financed predominantly by
borrowing, the current tax system provides full offset at all
forseeable rates of inflation. In fact, the current system
overcompensates in a significant range of cases."[20]  Full
interest deductibility can thus constitute a powerful incentive
to undertake risky investments yielding capital gains.
Indexing of the capital cost of assets and debt interest and
moving to an accrual basis of taxation would eliminate the
inflation-induced distortions in the capital gains tax. Indexing
of debt interest would help to reduce the magnitude of the
incentive to convert non-deductible consumer and mortgage debt
into deductible interest expense. This might make it easier to
restrict deductible interest and to apply tracing  or streaming
rules relating interest expense to income producing investment
assets in order to determine deductibility.[21]  Other important 
distortions such as the exemption of gains on principal 
residences and other tax-sheltered assets and the limitations 
of the deductibility of  losses would remain.
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While indexing the capital gains tax and related interest expense
is desirable on equity and efficiency grounds, there are a number
of problems that must be considered. First, the indexing
calculation itself would be complicated and would require
information on the level of the consumer price index on the
acquisition and sales dates. It would be difficult for taxpayers
to correctly make the necessary calculation and would be
difficult for the tax authorities to review. Second, depending on
how the indexing was introduced there could be valuation day
problems similar to those associated with the introduction of
capital gains in 1972. Third, the indexation of debt would be
necessarilly  complex, particularly if debt interest was to be
indexed in such a way as to minimize the transitional gains and
losses resulting from an immediate full withdrawal of the
deduction for the inflation premium component of interest expense
on loans to acquire indexed assets. If the indexation of assets
was not comprehensive, an additional dimension would be added to
the tracing problem. It could require that individual taxpayers
file detailed statements of their assets and liabilities each
year. Fourth, the indexation of capital gains on shares of
private corporations would make possible a de facto indexation of
asset values.  This would be undesirable in the absence of a
comprehensive indexation of business income. Reasons that small
business would be reluctant to accept comprehensive indexation
have already been mentioned.
5.2 Indexed Securities Investment Plan (ISIP)
In a consultation paper released with the June 1982 budget
entitled (Inflation and the Taxation of Personal Investment
Income), it was proposed that a Registered Shareholder Investment
Plan (RSIP) be established to provide for a limited form of cost
base indexation for individuals investing in listed common shares
of corporations taxable in Canada. The cost base of contributions
to this plan would be indexed by the rate of inflation. Gains
would be taxed on an accrual basis and would not qualify for the
$1,000 investment income deduction. Losses would not be subject
to the $2,000 ceiling on deductibility. Carrying charges on funds
borrowed to invest in RSIPs would not be deductible.
The RSIP proposal was referred to a committee of prominent
individuals under the Chairmanship of Pierre Lortie for study and
recommendations. The Committee recommeded that a modified RSIP
for listed common shares be adopted as a partial approach to
exempting the inflation component of capital gains from taxation.
The modifications suggested were: deferral of taxation of accrued
gains; broadened eligibility for assets to include other types of
publicly traded or quoted equity securities; extension of
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eligible RSIP holders to include estates; and the inclusion of
mutual and other pooled funds in the RSIP.[22]
Minister of Finance Marc Lalonde announced in acceptance of the
Lortie Committee's recommendations on the RSIP in his statement
of October 1982. Draft legislation implementing an Indexed
Securities Investment Plan (ISIP) as of October 1, 1983 was
tabled with the April 1983 budget.
A simplified example of how ISIP works is provided in Table 4.
The cost base of the plan is determined by the initial
contribution of $10,000 on January 1 to purchase shares. This
base is indexed monthly by the increase in the CPI. In the
example the rate of inflation is assumed to be 5 per cent per
year or .4 per cent per month. As a result of indexing at this
rate, the indexed cost of the ISIP portfolio is increased to
$10,457 by December 31. If over the same period the portfolio
appreciates by 20 per cent, its fair market value as of December
31 will be $12,000, yielding a real gain of $1,543 over the
course of the year. Of this 25 per cent or $386 will be
recognized as a capital gain and half of which or $193 will be
taxable. The recognition of only 25 per cent of capital gains on
an accrual basis is the most important modification of the
original government proposal recommended by the Lortie Committee.
In year 2 the opening cost ($10,843) is equal to the fair market
($12,000) value less the deferred gain ($1,157). Alternatively,
it is equal to initial cost ($10,000) plus the sum of the
accumulated inflation adjustment ($457) and the recognized gain
($386).
This is the essence of the ISIP calculation. For an actual
portfolio the arithmetic is more complicated. The indexing base
of the ISIP is increased as securities are purchased or
transferred to an ISIP. It is reduced as securities are sold.
Cash balances in the account are not indexed. ISIP losses are not
subject to the $2,000 limit on deductibility against ordinary
income. While the ISIP is simple in theory, it is much more
complicated in practice. The legislation implementing the ISIP
runs to 50 pages specifying such details as qualified
securities,authorized administrators, procedures for terminating
a plan, and rules for transferring securities.
The advantage of an ISIP can be illustrated by comparing the real
effective tax rate on an ISIP portfolio with a non-ISIP portfolio
given different assumptions for the inflation rate, the real
growth of the portfolio, the holding period, and the marginal tax
rate of the investor. The first figure on Chart 10 shows how the
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effective tax rate for a non-ISIP portfolio approaches 100 per
cent as inflation rises from 2 to 15 per cent. In contrast, the
effective tax rate for an ISIP portfolio remains just below the
25 per cent that is consistent with the accrual taxation of real
capital gains. 
The second figure in Chart 10 demonstrates the impact of the
magnitude of real gains on the effective tax rate. The
differential between ISIP and non-ISIP portfolios narrows as the
real gain increases. The tax benefits of deferral get greater the
higher the rate of real growth of the portfolio. This is the
lock-in effect which accrual taxation is designed to mitigate.
An ISIP is a good investment vehicle for high dividend yielding
stock exhibiting low real gains. It is less desirable for low
dividend yielding stocks with high real gains. An exception is if
the stock is high risk. Then the full loss offset feature of the
ISIP is attractive.
The third figure in Chart 10 shows that the effective tax rate
for a non-ISIP portfolio is greatly reduced by an increase in the
holding period, whereas the effective tax rate for an ISIP
portfolio is only reduced slightly. This reflects the much
greater degree of deferral permitted outside of an ISIP.
Nevertheless, even with a holding period as long as 15 years, the
effective tax rate is still much higher on capital gains earned
outside of an ISIP and is well above the 25 per cent associated
with the accrual taxation of capital gains.
The first figure in Chart 11 provides graphic evidence of the
degree to which the benefits to be derived from an ISIP rise with
the marginal tax rate of the investor.
The second two figures in Chart 11 illustrate a different
important characteristic of an ISIP. It arises from the
non-deductibility of interest on debt incurred to finance
investment in an ISIP. The second figure shows that as a
percentage of the non-ISIP portfolio financed by debt rises to
the full extent allowed by existing margin regulations the tax
advantage of an ISIP turns into a disadvantage. The switchover
occurs when more than 25 per cent of the non-ISIP portfolio is
debt financed. At a 50 per cent debt financing ratio the
effective tax rate on a non-ISIP investment is actually negative,
indicating a tax subsidy. The third figure on Chart 11 testifies
to the dramatic way in which debt financing reduces the real
effective tax rate in a non-ISIP portfolio as the rate of
inflation increases.
Considering all the time and effort that went into the process
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whereby the ISIP was proposed, discussed, revised and
implemented, the number of ISIPs opened have been disappointingly
few. A rough estimate of their number, which can be used until
the Investment Dealers Association releases the results of its
recent survey, is about 5,000 accounts. Assuming an average
holding of $10,000 to $15,000 each, the total amount invested in
ISIPs can be estimated to be only around $50 to 75 million.
Compared with the total value of listed securities outstanding of
about $30 billion the amount invested in ISIPs approaches
insignificance
There are several possible explanations for the poor acceptance
of ISIPs. The simplest is that lower inflation has reduced the
tax advantages of investing through an ISIP. Nevertheless, even
at 5 per cent inflation there is still a substantial tax
advantage to be gained from an ISIP. For an investor with a 50
per cent marginal tax rate and a 5 year holding period, a
portfolio with a 3.5 per cent real capital gain would have an
effective tax rate of 24.1 per cent in an ISIP compared to 52.1
per cent outside.
The tax advantage associated with debt financing outside an ISIP
may be an explanation. Yet despite the prohibition on interest
deductibility for ISIPs proper, an ISIP can be still used as
collateral for other investment loans, thus circumventing many of
the disadvantages arising from the non-deductibility of interest
expense.
The fact that the gain is not eligible for the $1,000 investment
income deduction is another possible explanation. However, the
incentive to utilize fully the $1,000 investment deduction is
probably not a binding constraint for most stock market
investors.
An important reason for the lack of acceptance of the plan is
probably its complexity and inadequate understanding of its
advantages among investors. Many securities salesmen are said not
to understand the plan. The level of ignorance is even higher
among the wider investing public. Perhaps it will just take more
time for investors to catch on to ISIPs, or maybe it will
require inflation to pick up.
Various suggestions have been made to improve the popularity of
ISIPs. The Investment Dealers Association has recommended that
the administrative costs of ISIP should be made fully deductible
rather than only half deductible as at present. Their other
recommendation is that ISIP gains be eligible for inclusion in
the $1,000 investment income deduction.
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Some problems with ISIPs have been identified. The most serious
is the preferential treatment it accords publicly traded or
quoted equity securities over other assets. Concern has been
expressed about the effect of this preference on the ability of
other companies to raise equity capital. C.K. Marchant has
observed that out of 300 thousand enterprises in Canada with
assets in excess of $250,000 or sales in excess of $500,000 only
about 1,700 or less than 1 per cent of the total number of
companies were listed on the five Canadian stock exchanges.[23]
The Lortie Committee itself was concerned not to discriminate
against private corporations and recommended that "consideration
be given to the possibility of providing relief for taxation of
inflation-induced illusory gains on the disposal of common shares
of private corporations held for five years or more."[24]
Another problem that ISIP creates in the absence of more
comprehensive indexation is the potential for tax arbitrage. Debt
can be incurred to finance non-ISIP holdings of investment
assets. If necessary, ISIP securities can be pledged as
collateral. The current rules for tracing or streaming deductible
debt and investments are relatively loose, and would not prevent
such a use of an ISIP as long as the ISIP itself was purchased
without incurring additional debt. This puts the investor in a
position where he can have his cake and eat it too. By
effectively financing ISIP investments with deductible debt, an
investor could benefit from both indexing of capital gains and
the full deductibility of nominal interest.[25]  For such tax
arbitrage to become a pressing problem ISIPs would have to become
much more prevalent. 
In summary, in theory ISIPs should largely eliminate the
inflation-induced increases in the taxation of common shares. In
practice, ISIPs have not yet caught on sufficiently to have any
appreciable effect. In a sense, the simple availability of ISIPs
as an option satisfies the equity issue raised by the taxation of
inflationary capital gains. If individuals pay a higher effective
tax on capital gains due to inflation, it is because they choose
not to take advantage of ISIPs. On efficiency grounds, the
effects of the ISIP are ambiguous, although as long as the ISIPs
do not become more widespread they are not likely to be
significant. On the one hand, the ISIP reduces the distortions in
the taxation of capital gains in common shares. This should
reduce the tax advantage of investing in owner occupied housing
and other tax sheltered investments. It should also encourage
savings and make more equity capital available to firms. The
beneficial effect on the availability of funds, however, is
mitigated by the extent to which the cost of capital is
determined on international capital markets. On the other hand,
-33-
the ISIP discriminates against other assets that do not benefit
from indexation, the most important of which is shares in private
corporations. The ISIP also makes it possible to utilize fully
deductible debt to finance the purchase of an indexed asset. This
creates new opportunities for tax arbitrage.
5.3 Interest Income
There are two ways to index interest income. One is to allow
taxpayers a deduction equal to the inflation premium portion of
interest income as measured by the product of the value of
outstanding  principal and of the rate of increase in a general
price index such as the consumer price index. Another is only to
allow the tax indexation of indexed instruments. This latter
approach was that proposed in the Green Paper on (Inflation
and the Taxation of Personal Investment Income).
The specific proposal was to create a new type of debt instrument
called an indexed term deposit (ITD). The inflation premium on
income earned from ITDs was to be exempt from tax and the real
return was to be taxed at ordinary rates. The funds raised
through the issuance of ITDs was to be loaned out at low real
rates as indexed term loans (ITLs) to borrowers who must be
either purchasers of new homes, or farmers, fishermen, or small
businesses purchasing new depreciable property. The low real
rates were to be ensured by allowing widespread holdings of ITDs
but limiting eligibility for ITLs. The inflation premium on ITLs
was not to be allowed as a deduction to the borrower. However,
since eligible borrowers were either non-taxable or subject to a
low rate of  tax, this was not expected to be a major drawback.
The Lortie Committee recommended that the government "not proceed
with the Indexed Term Deposit and Indexed Term Loan proposal
because of the economic distortions and other difficulties that
would arise."[26] The specific objections cited were four:
- problems of resource allocation;
- mandatory use of real-term instruments to obtain tax benefits;
- problems for financial intermediaries;
- government intervention in resource allocation.[27]
The distortions in resource allocation identified were within
eligible sectors, between eligible and non-eligible sectors, and
among financial institutions. Within eligible sectors there was a
bias in favour of new housing or new depreciable assets that
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could depress the price of existing assets and blunt the
incentive to make the best use of existing assets. The
distortions between eligible and non-eligible sectors could
result in the diversion of savings away from non-eligible sectors
such as large corporations that account for most of the economy's
investment. Certain classes of financial institutions would also
be favoured by the proposal.
The Lortie Committee did not say it but the magnitude of the
potential distortions was so large that the proposal once
implemented would either have to be abandoned or expanded.
The Lortie Committee had serious reservations about making
contracting in real terms the price of tax reform. Instead the
Committee favoured an approach involving various steps to
facilitate contracting in real terms.
The Lortie Committee was concerned about problems for financial
intermediaries. One particular problem was the need to match
indexed term loans and indexed term deposits. This would be
difficult if as estimated the supply of indexed deposits were to
exceed the demand for indexed loans by a wide margin.
Finally, the Lortie Committee voiced strong reservations about
the way in which the proposal significantly extended direct
government intervention in the allocation of credit.
The Lortie Committee did a great service in clearly and
forthrightly setting out the key objections to the government's
proposal for ITLs and ITDs. The government accepted the Lortie
Committee's recommendation and dropped the proposal. A limited
form of indexation of interest income was not to be.
The question remains as to the need for indexation. Much interest
income is still subject to tax on its inflation premium
component. However, the $1,000 investment income deduction
provides an important shelter for interest income. Registered
Pension Plans and Registered Savings Plans also shelter interest
income. It was proposed by the old government that the limit on
tax deductible contributions to retirement savings plans be
increased to $10,000 in 1985 rising to $15,500 by 1988. If
implemented by the new government, this would provide an
important additional element of tax relief for interest income.
Furthermore, a considerable easing of inflation has much shrunk
the inflation premium component of interest income and lessened
the need for indexation.
The consequences of indexing interest income are not all
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beneficial. There is the loss of revenue to the government which
would have to be made up elsewhere. If the indexation extended to
interest expense as well as interest income, part of the revenue
loss would be recouped. But there would still be interest income
not linked with interest expense. This would flow from consumer,
mortgage, and government debt. Also it would not be desirable to
eliminate the deductibility of the inflation premium on corporate
debt. Since the cost of capital to corporation is largely
determined on international markets,  this redistribution of tax
burdens would raise the cost of capital and tend to discourage
investment. Granted that savings would be stimulated, but
real-after tax rates of return and savings are already high
enough in the short-run. If anything, given current and
prospective levels of unemployment, the economy would benefit
from a decline in savings and the extra demand that this would
entail.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
If inflation were still at double-digit levels or were heading
back quickly in that direction, the benefits to be derived from
moving towards a comprehensive indexation of business and
investment income would certainly outweigh the costs. If
inflation slows further to the zero or 2 per cent range and thus
disappears as a problem, there would from a domestic point of
view be only the costs from indexation and no benefits. As long
as inflation stays below 5 per cent as forecast by the Minister
of Finance in his November 8 statement, indexation and the effect
of inflation on the taxation of business and investment income
should not be a priority concern. The sudden and dramatic slowing
in inflation since 1982 is the main reason that the government
has never acted on the Lortie Committee's recommendation for a
comprehensive study of the issue.
If inflation breaks out again into the double-digit range for
reasons beyond the control of the monetary and fiscal authorities
-- an unlikely event given the powerful deflationary forces at
work in the economy -- then further indexation should be
considered for domestic tax policy reasons. The most attractive
indexation option would be to index the capital consumption
allowance on new capital investment and to remove the 3 per cent
limit on the inventory reduction. This could be financed by some
reduction in corporate tax preferences so as to achieve a more
neutral distribution of the tax burden across asset types and
industries.
The indexation of interest income and expense would be more
problematic. Granted that the indexation of interest income and
expense would eliminate an important source of distortions in the
allocation of resources. However, this would come at a high
revenue cost to the government. Moreover, with capital highly
mobile internationally, indexation of interest would raise the
after-tax cost of capital to Canadian business. The current
system of full nominal interest deductibility provides a generous
incentive for debt-financed investment which could only be
withdrawn at a risk of seriously depressing  investment spending.
The timing of any such withdrawal would thus have major
implications for stabilization policy. A related consideration
would be the important disadvantages from the point of view of
stabilization policy in departing so radically from the tax
treatment accorded interest in the United States.
For individual investors, the indexation of interest income would
encourage savings. This, however, would not be an unmixed
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blessing in an economy faced with the prospect of high
unemployment lasting till perhaps the end of the decade. The case
for indexing interest income on equity grounds would also not be
that strong given that much interest income is already sheltered
by the $1,000 investment income deduction and registered savings
plans.
With respect to the tax treatment of capital gains in another
renewed bout of double-digit inflation, the ISIP goes some way to
satisfying the tax equity problems resulting from the interaction
of the capital gains tax and inflation. It would be much more
difficult to apply indexing to other assets. It would also not be
equitable to extend the indexation of capital gains without
offering comparable treatment to interest income. It is not clear
that the country would necessarily benefit from a reduction in
taxes on capital gains and investment income at the expense of
increases in taxes on other income.
There are two situations in which a full-scale comprehensive tax
indexation would be the best way to proceed. The first and most
obvious situation would be if inflation were to take off well
into the double-digit range and a hyper-inflation were to become
a real possibility. Such a scenario, while highly improbable,
would probably be triggered by the onset of a U.S. and maybe even
worldwide hyper-inflation. In this event, most major
industrialized countries would probably be forced to adopt
comprehensive tax indexation, and many of the objections to a
go-alone strategy of comprehensive indexation would thereby lose
their validity.
The second and less clear-cut situation where it would be
desirable to adopt something approximating a comprehensive
indexation of the tax system would be if inflation were to remain
near current levels or increase and if the  recent Treasury
Department proposals were to be implemented in the United States.
The advantages to be gained from maintaining a certain degree of
tax harmonization with the United States along with the
allocative and equity considerations favouring comprehensive tax
indexation would outweigh the disadvantages of the resulting
increased complexity of the tax system.  
If inflation continues to decline, however, there is no reason to
adopt comprehensive indexation in Canada regardless of what is
done in the United States. With low inflation there is little
difference between the distribution of tax burdens for an indexed
or unindexed system and inflation-induced distortions become
insignificant.
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The decline in inflation has taken  comprehensive indexing off
the top of the Canadian agenda for tax reform. If comprehensive
tax indexing were implemented in the United States, there would
inevitably be renewed interest in indexing in Canada that would
put it back on top. Barring this, however, it will take a much
higher level of inflation than expected in the medium-term to
generate much support for comprehensive indexation.  If inflation
indeed stays down, we are much better off with a simpler
unindexed tax system than with a more complicated indexed tax
system.
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TABLES
TABLE 1
TAX PARAMETERS USED IN CALCULATING THE USER COST OF CAPITAL
AND EFFECTIVE TAX RATES FOR VARIOUS INDUSTRY GROUPS AND
CATEGORIES OF INVESTMENT, 1984
                                                                 
        Investment   Capital
                                                                        Tax      Consumption
                                                  Corporate     Credit     Allowance
                                                    Tax Rate      Rate        Rate
1. Large, Non-Atlantic region,
    Non-Manufacturing
  1.1 Machinery and Equipment             46            7           20
  1.2 Non-Residential Construction        46            7            5   
2. Large, Atlantic region,
    Non-Manufacturing
  2.1 Machinery and Equipment             46           20           20
  2.2 Non-Residential Construction        46           20            5
3. Large, Non-Atlantic region,
    Manufacturing
  3.1 Machinery and Equipment             40            7           50
  3.2 Non-Residential Construction        40            7            5
4. Large, Atlantic region,
    Manufacturing
  4.1 Machinery and Equipment             40           20           50
  4.2 Non-Residential Construction        40           20            5
5. Small, Non-Atlantic region,
    Non-Manufacturing
  5.1 Machinery and Equipment             25            7           20
  5.2 Non-Residential Construction        25            7            5
6. Small, Non-Atlantic region,
    Manufacturing
  6.1 Machinery and Equipment             20            7           50
  6.2 Non-Residential Construction        20            7            5
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TABLE 2
EXAMPLES OF VARIATIONS IN THE COMPONENTS OF THE
1984 EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON CAPITAL GAINS ACCRUED
FROM DIFFERENT INVESTMENT ASSETS FOR A TAXPAYER
WITH A 50 PER CENT MARGINAL TAX RATE
                                                    Effect of
                            Accrual-based                     Actual real
                           taxation of 50%   Lack of           effective
ASSET                       of real gains  indexation Deferral tax rate
Real estate
 Speculative renovation            25          18.6      -1.8     41.8
 Urban rental property             25         238.1     -64.5    198.6
 Farm Land                         25         119.0     -58.0     86.0
Common Stocks  
 Speculative new issues            25           7.9        -      32.9
 Large public company              25          47.6     -12.7     59.9
 ISIP - Large public company       25            -       -1.0     24.0
Principal residences and other
 tax sheltered investments         25            -         -       0.0
Notes: These calculations are based on those presented in John
Bossons,"Economic Effects of the Capital Gains Tax,"
Canadian Tax Journal, vol. 29, no. 6 (November-December
1981), p.812 and pp. 830-833. Figures shown for each
asset type are basedon typical pre-tax rates of return,
income composition, and holding periods; the specific
assumptions for each asset are listed in Table A-1 in
the appendix of Bossons, op cit, pp. 830-833. Figures
are expressed as a percentage of real pre-tax income.
Investments are assumed to be equity financed. The rate
of inflation is assumed to be 5 per cent.
-41-
TABLE 3
REAL RATES OF RETURN AND HOLDING PERIODS
FOR DIFFERENT INVESTMENT ASSETS
                                Annual Rate of 
                                Accrual of Real        Holding    
                                                        Period
                               Capital Gains (%)      in years
Real Estate
 Speculative renovation              6.4                    2 
 Urban rental property                .5                   15
 Farm Land                           1.0                   25
Common Stocks  
 Speculative new issues             15.0                    1
 Large public company                2.5                    8  
 ISIP - Large public company         2.5                    8
Principal residences and tax
 sheltered investments               1.5                   30
Source: Assumptions, except for ISIP, are taken from John
Bossons,
        "Economic Effects of the Capital Gains Tax," Canadian
        Tax Journal, vol. 29, no. 6 (November-December 1981),
        p. 831.
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TABLE 4
EXAMPLE OF ISIP INDEXING
YEAR 1
   Securities Purchased - January 1                    $10,000
   Accumulated Inflation Adjustment - December 31 (1)      457
   Indexing Cost - December 31                          10,457
   Fair Market Value - Decembver 31 (2)                 12,000
   Real Gain                                             1,543
   Deferred Gain - 75% of $1,543                         1,157
   ISIP Gain - 25% of $1,543                               386
   Taxable ISIP Gain - 1/2 of $386                         193
YEAR 2
   Opening Fair Market Value - January 1                12,000
   Less Deferred gain                                    1,157
   Indexing Cost                                        10,843
(1) 5% per year or .41% from February through December.
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Real Growth! 3.5%
Marginal Tax Rate! 50%
Years Held! 5
Inflation: 5%
Marginal Tax Rate! 50%
Years Held: 5
Real Growth! 3.5%
Inflation: 5%
Marginal Tax Rate: 50%
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Real Growth: 3.5,%
Inflation: 5%
Years Held: 5
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Inflation: 5%
Marginal Tax Rate: 50%
Years Held: 5
Real Growth: 3.5%
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APPENDIX A
Methodology Used to Calculate User Cost and Effective Tax Rates
A.1 User Cost
The formulas used to calculate the user cost of capital shown in
Charts 1, 2, and 3 are as follows:
              C=100*P*C1*C2*C3/(1-T)
              C1=(R+DEP-(T*DEBT*(R+PDOT))
              C2=1-ITC
              C3=1-(T*Z)
where P is the price of capital goods set equal to 1;
      R is the real supply price of capital equal to .1;
      DEP is the depreciation rate equal to .0789 for 
      machinery and equipment and .0345 for non-residential
      construction;
      T is the applicable corporate tax rate from Table 1;
      DEBT is the proportion of the investment that is 
      debt-financed;
      PDOT is the rate of inflation;
      ITC is the investment tax credit rate from table 1; and
      Z is the present value of capital consumption allowances
      calculated using the rates given in table 1.
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A.2 Effective Corporate Tax Rates
The effective tax rates shown in Charts 4 through 9 were
calculated by taking the ratio of the present value of taxes to
the present value of real income expressed in current dollars.
Present values were calculated using a discount factor equal to
the product of 1 plus the real interest rate (assumed to be 10
per cent) and 1 plus the rate of inflation.
Real income expressed in current dollars was calculated as return
on the investment minus real interest and indexed depreciation.
Return on investment in year N was calculated as follows:
     RETURN[N]=100*((1+PDOT)^(N-1))*((1-DEP)^(N-1))*(R+DEP)
where RETURN is return on investment;
      N is the year;
      100 is the initial investment;
      PDOT is the rate of inflation;
      R is the real rate of return; and
      DEP is the depreciation rate set as in the calculation of 
      user cost.
Taxes are calculated as:
     TAXES=(T*RETURN)- ((T*INTDEDUCTION)+(T*CCA)+(ITC*100))
where INTDEDUCTION is either nominal or real interest payments
      depending on whether the tax system is indexed on
      the proportion of the investment that is debt financed;
      CCA is capital consumption allowances on 100 investment 
      either indexed or unindexed as applicable calculated
      using rates shown in table 1 taking into account half
      year rule; and 
      ITC is the investment tax credit.
       
An alternative methodology for calculating effective tax rates
based on a comparison of before-tax and after-tax internal rates
of return
was also tried but was not utilized because of the extreme
sensitivity of the results to what were considered to be
unreasonably high internal rates of return.
A.3 Capital Gains
The effective tax rates on capital gains displayed on table 2 are
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based on  John Bossons' methodology.[28]  The assumptions
utilized for the annual rate of accrual of real capital gains and
the holding period are given in Table 3.
The effective tax rate is calculated using the following
formulas:
             ETR1=1-((1+RRCG)^(1/H)-1)/R
             RRCG=((1+NRCG)/((1+PDOT)^H))-1
             NRCG=(((1+G)^H)-1)*(1-.5*T)
             G=(1+PDOT)*(1+R)-1
where ETR1 is the effective tax rate on capital gains;
      RRCG is the real after-tax gain;
      H is the holding period;
      R is the annual rate of accrual of real capital gains;
      NRCG is the nominal after-tax capital gain realized 
      after H years;
      PDOT is the inflation rate;
      G is the nominal rate of accrual of capital gains; and 
      T is the marginal tax rate.
The effect of deferral in reducing the inflation induced tax
increases is calculated as the difference between the effective
tax rate (ETR1) which reflects both inflation and deferred
taxation and another effective tax rate (ETR2) which reflects the
effects of inflation and no deferral. This other  effective tax
rate is calculated using the following formulas:
             ETR2=1-(ACG/R)
             ACG=(1+G*(1-.5*T))/(1+PDOT)-1
where ACG is the after-tax real capital gain accrued in the
      current year assuming no deferral of tax; and 
      the other variables are as defined above.
The effect of the lack of indexation is calculated residually
given the actual realeffective tax rate, the rate for
accrual-based taxation of 50 per cent of real gains (25 per cent
for a taxpayer in the 50 per cent marginal tax bracket), and the
effect of deferral.
The calculation of the real effective tax rates for an Indexed
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Security Investment Plan (ISIP) is somewhat more involved given
the complexity of the plan. The fair market value of the ISIP in
year I is assumed to have an initial value of 1 and to grow with
the real return and inflation.
             FMV[I]=FMV[I-1]*(1+R)*(1+PDOT)
An example of how the indexing of an ISIP works was provided in
table 4 above. It can be expressed mathematically as:
          
            INDEXCOST[I]=(INDEXCOST[I-1]*(1+PDOT)) +
                         0.25*(FMV[I]-(INDEXCOST[I-1]*(1+PDOT)))
The tax on the gain is:
            TAX[I]=0.5*T*0.25*(FMV[I]-(INDEXCOST[I-1]*(1+PDOT)))
 
To simplify the calculation, it was assumed that the tax is not
paid out of the ISIP, but instead is financed at an after-tax
cost related to the rate of real gain. Cumulative tax is thus
defined as follows:
           CUMTAX[I]=(CUMTAX[I-1]*(1+((1-T)*R))*(1+PDOT))+TAX[I]  
      
The return after-tax at the end of the holding period is the
increase in fair market value over the holding period minus
cumulative taxes.
          RETURN=FMV[H+1]-FMV[1]-CUMTAX[H+1]
The real after-tax annual rate of return is calculated as
follows.
        RRETURNREAL=((((1+RETURN)/((1+PDOT)^H)))^(1/H))-1
The real effective tax rate is:
     ETR=1-(RRETURNREAL/R)
